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Standing to Raise a Conflict of Interest
IvY JOHNSON*

I. INTRODUCTION

ules of professional conduct forbid attorneys from undertaking
representations that may adversely affect the interests of a current

or former client. These rules are intended to protect clients and

their relationship with their attorney. However, parties who are neither
clients nor former clients frequently bring conflicts of interest to the
attention of courts to advance their own strategic interests. By raising a
conflict of interest and seeking to disqualify opposing counsel, parties can
delay litigation and increase the costs of litigation for their opponents.
For many years, courts have presumed that the attorneys representing
such parties have standing to raise a conflict of interest because of their
professional obligation to report violations of ethics rules. In recent years,
however, the U.S. Supreme Court has elucidated the requirements for
constitutional standing and increased the vigor with which it enforces those
requirements. In doing so, the Court has cast doubt on the standing of
parties who are neither clients nor former clients of an attorney to move for
his disqualification due to a conflict of interest.
II. CONFLICT OF INTEREST RULES
Attorneys may not undertake a representation in which they have a
conflict of interest. Under Rule 1.7 of the American Bar Association's
Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules"), a conflict of
interest arises when an attorney takes on a client whose representation will
be directly adverse to another client.1 A conflict of interest also arises
when the representation may be materially limited by responsibilities that
the attorney has to others, including another client, or may be materially
limited by his own interests.2 The latter type of conflict may arise when an
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2.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a) (1983).
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) (1983).
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attorney represents co-defendants or co-plaintiffs whose interests diverge in
some way. Under Rule 1.9 of the Model Rules, a conflict of interest also
arises when an attorney takes on a client whose representation will be
adverse to the interests of a former client and involves a matter that is
substantially related to one in which the attorney represented the former
client.4 Most states have similar rules that have been adopted either by the
state bar in the form of a rule or by the state legislature in the form of a
statute.5 Federal courts are not bound to apply the disciplinary rules of the
state in which they sit, 6 but instead rely upon their "inherent powers" to
regulate the attorneys that appear before them. In general, however,
federal courts either apply the Model Rules or the rules of the state in
which they sit, or adopt similar local rules.8
Lawyers have the primary responsibility for resolving conflict of
interest questions. 9 Thus, the Rules require a lawyer to decline a
representation that will give rise to a conflict, and if a conflict arises after a
representation has been undertaken, the lawyer must withdraw.'0 In the
litigation context, the Model Rules also provide that courts may raise the

3.

4.

MODELRULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. (1983).
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.9 (1983).

5.
See, e.g., OKLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.1.7 (1988), codified as OKLA.
STAT. tit. 5 § 1, app 3-A (copying verbatim Rule 1.7 of the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct); N.Y. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101, 5-105, 5-108
(1999), codified as N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, §§ 1200.20, 1200.24, 1200.27

(1999) (barring representation if professional judgment will be affected by lawyer's own
interests or by the representation of another client, or if representation would be adverse to a
former client in the "same or substantially related" matter).
6.
See Cord v. Smith, 338 F.2d 516, 524 (9th Cir. 1964):
[W]e do not think that the rule of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins . . .
compels the federal courts to permit, in proceedings before those courts,
whatever action by an attorney ...

may be sanctioned by the courts of

the state. When an attorney appears before a federal court, he is acting
as an officer of that court, and it is that court which must judge his
conduct.

Id.
7.
Id.
8.
See, e.g., In re Corn Derivatives Antitrust Litig., 748 F.2d 157, 160 (3d Cir.
1984) ("We believe that the appropriate guidance for finding the current national standards
of ethical norms lies in the standards promulgated by the American Bar Association.").
9.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. (1983).
10.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. (1983). The attorney need not
decline the representation or withdraw if (1) he reasonably believes that the conflict will not
adversely affect the representation, and, in the case of a representation directly adverse to a
current client, will not adversely affect the relationship with the current client, and (2) the
client consents after consultation. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (1983).
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question sua sponte when "there is reason to infer that the lawyer has
neglected the responsibility."'"
Attorneys also have an obligation to report professional misconduct
by other attorneys. This obligation has evolved over time, 12 and varies by
jurisdiction, 3 but remains one of the central features of self-regulation by
the legal profession. 14 Professional misconduct that must be reported
includes violation of the rules prohibiting a lawyer from undertaking a
representation that may give rise to a conflict of interest. 15

1.7 cmt. (1983). See also MODEL RULES
R. 1.9 cmt. (1983) (referring reader to Comment to Model Rule 1.7
when opposing party raises question of conflict of interest regarding former client).
12.
Compare MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-103(A) (1980)
(requiring lawyer with "knowledge of a violation" to report to "authority empowered to
invcstigate or act upon such violation"), with MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a)
(1983) (requiring lawyer with knowledge that another lawyer has committed a violation that
"raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a
lawyer" to inform "the appropriate professional authority").
13.
See, e.g., N.Y. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-103 (1999), codified as
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.4 (1999) (requiring that a lawyer with
knowledge of a violation "that raises a substantial question as to another lawyer's honesty
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer shall report such knowledge to a tribunal or other
authority empowered to investigate or act upon such violation"); CALIFORNIA RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT (1989) (imposing no obligation to report).
See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3 cmt. (1983).
14.
15.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4 (1983) ("It is professional
misconduct for a lawyer to . ..violate the Rules of Professional Conduct."). See also
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (1983), which reads:
11.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.

OF PROF'L CONDUCT

(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of
that client will be directly adverse to another client, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will
not adversely affect the relationship with the other
client; and
(2)

each client consents after consultation.

(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of
that client may be materially limited by the lawyer's
responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the
lawyer's own interests, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will
not be adversely affected; and
(2)

When
the client consents after consultation.
representation of multiple clients in a single matter is
undertaken, the consultation shall include explanation
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It is unclear, however, to whom an attorney must report a conflict of
interest. The Model Rules require an attorney who knows that another
attorney has committed a violation of the Rules to "inform the appropriate
professional authority.'' 6 The Model Rules also indicate that lawyers
should report violations to the "bar disciplinary agency."' 7 The language in
the Model Rules represents a change from that of its predecessor, the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility (Model Code), which required
a lawyer who knew of a Model Code violation to report the violation "to a
tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or act upon such
'8
violation."'
It is generally accepted that attorneys who are representing clients or
former clients of opposing counsel may bring the conflict to the attention of
the court by moving to disqualify opposing counsel.' 9 After all, the rules
prohibiting an attorney from undertaking a representation in which he has a
conflict of interest are intended to protect the interests of clients and former
clients. 20 The rules are intended to preserve the loyalty that attorneys
should have to their clients.2' Undertaking a representation in which an
attorney must directly oppose his own client would undermine such
loyalty.22 The conflicts rules also protect the confidentiality of information
that attorneys learn in the course of representing their clients. 23 For
example, by taking on a client whose representation will be directly
adverse to another client, an attorney may be forced to choose either to use

of the implications of the common representation and
the advantages and risks involved.

Id; MODEL

RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.9 (1983) (prohibiting a representation
that is materially adverse to the interests of a former client in "the same or a
substantially related matter," unless the former client consents).
16.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (1983).

17.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.

8.3 cmt. (1983).

21.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.

1.7 cmt. (1983).

18.
MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-103(A) (1980) (emphasis
added).
19.
See In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litigation, 530 F.2d 83, 89 (5th Cir.
1976) (stating general rule that former client may move to disqualify attorney); Colyer v.
Smith, 50 F. Supp. 2d 966, 971 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (same); Dawson v. City of Bartlesville,
901 F. Supp. 314, 314 (N.D. Ok. 1995) (same); Beck v.Bd. of Regents, 568 F. Supp. 1107,
1110 (D. Kan. 1983) (same).
20.
Cox v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 847 F.2d 725, 728-729 (11 th Cir. 1988).
22.
Id.
23.
See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 7.1.1, at 313-14 (1986)
(explaining that confidentiality may be threatened whenever representation creates threat
that current or former client's confidences may be revealed or used against client's
interests).
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confidential information of one client to benefit the other client, or to limit

his representation of the other client by not using such information.
In some cases, however, attorneys seek to disqualify opposing counsel
even though their clients are neither clients or former clients of opposing
For
counsel nor otherwise affected by the alleged conflict of interest.
example, attorneys may move for disqualification when opposing counsel
represents a party whose interests are adverse to a former client of his even
though the former client is not a party to the litigation. 25 Attorneys may
also move to disqualify opposing counsel when he represents multiple
clients who have, or potentially have, conflicting interests.26 The Model
Rules provide that when a conflict clearly calls into question the "fair or
efficient administration of justice," opposing counsel may raise the
question. 27 Although the Model Rules are unclear on this point, many
courts have concluded that this provision permits attorneys to move to
disqualify opposing counsel28 even though their clients are unaffected by the
alleged conflict of interest.
Permitting attorneys to move for disqualification when their clients
are unaffected by the alleged conflict of interest risks abuse of the rules of
professional conduct. Motions to disqualify, particularly if they succeed,
serve as a tactical tool to achieve delay and raise the costs of litigation for
the other side. 29 According to one U.S. Court of Appeals judge, it is now
widely recognized that "disqualification motions have become common
tools of the litigation process, being used . . . for purely strategic
purposes." 3 ° Concern over such abuse has prompted some to question

See, e.g., Colyer, 50 F. Supp. 2d at 968 (seeking disqualification because, in
24.
suit by deputy sheriff, defending sheriff's department placed counsel in conflict with
interests of its client, another deputy sheriff); Dawson, 901 F. Supp. at 314 (noting that
plaintiff did not assert prejudice from conflict of interest that allegedly arose from opposing
counsel representing all three defendants).
See Colyer, 50 F. Supp. 2d at 968 (explaining that deputy sheriff, plaintiff in
25.
suit against sheriffs department, had moved to disqualify defense counsel because they had
previously represented another deputy sheriff in suit against department).
See Dawson, 901 F. Supp. at 314 (seeking disqualification of defense counsel
26.
who represented city, city manager, and police chief in § 1983 action).
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. (1983).
27.
28.
See Abbott v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 42 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1050 (D. Colo.
1999) (noting that case law permits opposing party to raise conflict of interest (citing
COLORADO RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. which states that opposing counsel may
move for disqualification, "[w]here the conflict is such as clearly to call in question the fair
or efficient administration of justice.")).
See SMI Indus. Canada Ltd. v. Caelter Indus., Inc., 586 F. Supp. 808, 814
29.
(N.D.N.Y. 1984) (noting tactical reasons behind many disqualification motions).
30.
Van Graefeiland, Lawyers Conflict of Interest: A Judge's View (Part II),
N.Y.L.J., July 20, 1977, at 1.
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whether attorneys with clients whose interests will be unaffected by a
conflict of interest have standing to move for disqualification of opposing
counsel.
III. STANDING
A party must have standing to seek disqualification of opposing
counsel in federal court.31 In Warth v. Seldin, the Supreme Court explained
that standing is the determination of "whether [a] litigant is entitled to have
the court decide the merits of a dispute or of particularissues."32 Thus, a
party moving to disqualify opposing counsel in federal court must have
standing to raise the issues in his disqualification motion, not merely those
in the underlying litigation.33
To have standing, Article III of the Constitution requires the party
seeking relief to have suffered an "injury in fact" that is fairly traceable to
34
the conduct at issue and redressable by a favorable decision of the court.
The injury may be actual or imminent, but must be one that the party has
suffered, or will suffer, personally.35 Requiring an "injury in fact" ensures
that there is an actual dispute between adverse litigants as required by
Article 111.36 It assures "concrete adverseness" between the parties, "which
sharpens the presentation of issues" in the litigation.37 It also preserves
judicial resources 38 and limits the volume of litigation in federal courts 39 by

assuring that parties have "a personal stake in the outcome '40 of a dispute.

31.
See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
32.
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (emphasis added).
33.
O'Connor v. Jones, 946 F.2d 1395, 1400 (8th Cir. 1991).
34.
Lujan, 422 U.S. at 560-61.
35.
Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979); Valley Forge
Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464,
472 (1982). CompareUnited States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973) (holding that students suffered injury from higher railroad
freight rates that would increase cost of, and thereby discourage, recycling, causing
increased pollution, and thus lessening their enjoyment of natural environment around
Washington, D.C.), with Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972) (holding Sierra
Club members lacked standing because they "failed to allege that [they] would be affected
in any of their activities or pastimes by the [challenged] development").
36.
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. I (limiting judicial power of the United States
to "Cases" and "Controversies"); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION §

2.3.2, at 61 (3d ed. 1999) (noting the same).
37.
Baker v.Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
38.
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.3.2, at 61 (3d ed. 1999).
39.

40.

ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.3.1, at 57-58 (3d ed. 1999).

Baker, 369 U.S. at 204 (1962).
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When a client or former client seeks to disqualify an attorney because
of a conflict of interest, the client is threatened with an injury---the breach
of the duties of confidentiality and loyalty owed to him by his attorney.42
However, a party who seeks to disqualify an attorney but who is not a
client or former client of that attorney is not threatened with injury from
such a breach of duties. Because the party is not a client or former client of
the attorney, the attorney does not owe him any duties of confidentiality or
loyalty. This apparent lack of injury raises the question of whether a party
who is not a client or former client suffers an injury sufficient for Article
IlI
standing.
IV. THE STATE OF THE LAW
Numerous federal courts have attempted to resolve the question of
whether a party who is not a client or former client has standing to move to
disqualify an attorney with a conflict of interest. 43 Most courts
acknowledge the "general rule [that] courts do not disqualify an attorney on
the grounds of conflict of interest unless the former client moves for
disqualification." 44 Nonetheless, many courts have found that non-clients
had standing based on the Model Code, which requires lawyers to report a
violation of the Code to "a tribunal or other authority empowered to
investigate or act upon such violation. 'A5 With the adoption of the Model
Rules, some courts turned to the provision, mentioned above, that permits
opposing counsel to move for disqualification when a conflict clearly calls
into question the "fair or efficient administration of justice. '4 6 Other courts
have found standing based on an injury to more general public interests.47
A number courts have adhered to the strict rule that non-clients do not have

See also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-14, at 11041.
It (2d ed. 1988) (noting purpose of standing doctrine is to properly limit role of federal
courts).
See Colyer v. Smith, 50 F. Supp. 2d 966, 969 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (explaining that
42.
injury suffered by client or former client arises from attorney's violation of duties of loyalty
and confidentiality).
The circuits remain divided on the issue. See Chapman Eng'rs, Inc. v. Natural
43.
Gas Sales Co., 766 F. Supp. 949, 955 n.1 (D. Kan. 1991) (noting positions taken by various
circuits).
44.
In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litig., 530 F.2d 83, 88 (5th Cir. 1976).
45.
MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, DR 1-103(A) (1980).
See infra notes 91-110 and accompanying text (discussing standing under the
46.
Model Rules).
47.
See id (discussing standing based on public interest rationale).
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standing to move for disqualification.48 Some of these courts, however,
have identified narrow exceptions that inject flexibility into the rule that
non-clients lack standing. 49
As the Supreme Court has applied
constitutional standing analysis more vigorously, some courts have begun
applying such analysis to50determine whether non-clients have standing to
raise a conflict of interest.
A. RULE-BASED STANDING

1. The Model Code
Initially, many courts relied upon the provisions of the Model Code to
resolve the question of whether non-clients have standing to raise a conflict
of interest. The Model Code requires lawyers to report violations of the
Code to "a tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or act upon
such violation."'', An early example is Estates Theatres, Inc. v. Columbia
Pictures Industries, Inc.,52 in which a theater owner brought an antitrust
action against various movie distributors and theater owners.53 The
plaintiff's attorney represented in other matters a theater owner who, at the
time of the motion, was named as a co-conspirator but was not a defendant
in the case.54 The defendants moved to disqualify the attorney alleging a
conflict of interest.5 5 The plaintiff challenged their standing to raise the
conflict5 6 The district court found that the defendants had standing,
pointing out that the Model Code requires lawyers to report violations.57
The court observed that "[w]hen the propriety of professional conduct is
questioned, any member of the Bar who is aware of the facts which give

48.
See infra notes 112-139 and accompanying text (discussing cases
strict rule against non-client standing).
49.
See infra notes 140-162 and accompanying text (discussing cases
narrow exceptions to rule against non-client standing).
50.
See infra notes 163-177 and accompanying text (discussing cases
constitutional analysis to determine whether non-clients have standing).
51.
MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, DR 1-103(A) (1980).
52.
345 F. Supp. 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
53.
Id. at 95.
54.
Id. at 96. At the time of the motion, the plaintiff was seeking to
defendant the other theater owner. Id. at 95.
55.
Id. at 95.
56.
Id. at 98.
57. Id.

adopting
adopting
applying

add as a
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rise to the issue is duty bound to present the matter to the proper forum.

' 58

Thus, the court concluded that the "attorneys representing other parties to
obligated to report the relevant facts to the Court for its
the litigation were
59
determination.,

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted this approach in deciding
In re Gopman.60 Gopman arose in the context of a federal grand jury
investigation of union corruption.6 1 Gopman, an attorney, represented the
union and, in so doing, advised several union officials who had been called
as witnesses to invoke the Fifth Amendment.62 The officials were not
targets of the investigation but they might have been subject to prosecution
63
The government moved to disqualify Gopman on
for their activities.
grounds that his dual representation of the union and the individual officials
created a conflict of interest. 64 The district court ordered Gopman to cease
representing the officials. 65 On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, Gopman
challenged the government's standing to raise the alleged conflict of
interest. 66 The court rejected the challenge citing Estates Theatres.67 The
court asserted that "[w]hen an attorney discovers a possible ethical
violation concerning a matter before [the] court, he is not only authorized
, ' 68
but is in fact obligated to bring the problem to [the] court's attention.
The court further stated that there was no reason why this obligation should
not operate when the lawyer is "directing the court's attention to the
conduct of opposing counsel. 6 9 The Fifth Circuit reaffirmed this
reasoning the next year in Brown & Williamson Tobacco v. Daniel
InternationalCorp.70 In that case, a complex breach of contract dispute, a
fourth-party defendant moved to disqualify an attorney representing both
the fourth-party plaintiff and another fourth-party defendant, which were
affiliated corporations. 7' The court concluded that the appellant "ha[d]
standing to seek disqualification even though it [was] not an aggrieved

58.

Estates Theatres, 345 F. Supp. at 98.

71.

Id. at 673.

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
531 F.2d 262 (5th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 264.
Id. at 264-65.
Id. at 264.
Id. at 265.
In re Gopman, 531 F.2d at 265.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 265-66.
563 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1977).
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client because its attorneys [were] authorized to report any ethical
violations committed in the case. 72
The Fourth and First Circuits also adopted rule-based standing for
non-clients moving to disqualify an attorney. In United States v. Clarkson,
the defendant, an attorney, was being prosecuted for fraud in the
preparation of tax refunds for various taxpayers.73
During the
government's investigation, the defendant asserted that he was representing
the very taxpayers whose claims for refunds were under investigation.74
The government, alleging a potential conflict between the interests of the
defendant and those of the taxpayers, moved to disqualify the defendant
from representing the taxpayers.75 Citing Gopman, the Fourth Circuit
concluded that "[t]he propriety of the Government's action in filing the
motion to disqualify cannot be questioned., 76 The court also noted the
holding in Estates Theatres "that any member of the bar aware of the facts
justifying a disqualification of counsel is obligated to call it to the attention
of the court. 77
The First Circuit considered the issue in Kevlik v. Goldstein.7 8 In
Kevlik, three plaintiffs brought a civil rights action based on an allegedly
false arrest against the town of Derry, New Hampshire.79 One of the
plaintiffs briefly engaged the attorney that ultimately represented the town
in the litigation. 8° The attorney consulted with the plaintiff and made an
initial appearance on his behalf, but then withdrew.8' After retaining
another attorney, the plaintiff settled his claims against the town.82 The
remaining plaintiffs subsequently moved to disqualify the attorney alleging
a conflict of interest.83 They asserted that the plaintiff who had settled
would be called as a witness, and that the attorney possessed privileged
information that could be used during the witness' testimony. 84 In
response, the attorney argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing because
only the former client, who was no longer present in the case, could raise a
72.
Id. (citing In re Gopman, 531 F.2d 262, 265-66 (5th Cir. 1976)).
73.
567 F.2d 270, 271 (4th Cir. 1977).
74.
Id.
75.
Id.
76.
Id. at 271 n.I (citing In re Gopman, 531 F.2d 262, 265 (5th Cir. 1976)).
77.
Id. (citing Estates Theatres, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 345 F. Supp.
93, 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)).
78.
724 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1984).
79.
Id. at 845-46.
80.
Id.
81.
Id. at 846.
82.
Id.
83.
Id.
84.
Kevlik, 724 F.2d at 846.
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disqualification motion.85 The First Circuit disagreed, noting that the
Model Code "clearly requires that an attorney come forward if he has
86
knowledge of an actual or potential violation of a Disciplinary Rule.",
The court expressly based its finding that the plaintiffs had standing on this
provision of the Model Code.87
In addition to the Fifth, Fourth and First Circuits, numerous district
courts have addressed the question of whether non-clients have standing to
raise a motion to disqualify.88 In these cases, the standing analysis rarely, if
ever, extends beyond the Model Code requirement that attorneys report a
violation of a disciplinary rule to the court. 89 After the American Bar

Id.
85.
Id. at 847.
86.
Id. at 848.
87.
See, e.g., Vegetable Kingdom, Inc. v. Katzen, 653 F. Supp. 917, 923 n.4
88.
(N.D.N.Y. 1987) (quoting SMI Indus. Canada Ltd. v. Caelter Indus., Inc., 586 F. Supp. 808,
815 (N.D.N.Y. 1984)) (finding that unaffected party may seek disqualification because
Model Code "confers standing on any attorney to challenge a lawyer's representation of a
client when he is privy to facts which justify disqualification"); SMI Indus. Canada Ltd. v.
Caelter Indus., Inc., 586 F. Supp. 808, 815 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) (asserting that attorney has
right and obligation to bring an alleged violation of a disciplinary rule to the court's
attention); Black v. Missouri, 492 F. Supp. 848, 861-62 (W.D. Mo. 1980) (citing Model
Code requirement in concluding that defendants had standing to bring conflict of interest to
court's attention though the clients who are affected by the alleged conflict have not
objected).
But see Vegetable Kingdom, Inc. v. Katzen, 653 F. Supp. 917, 921 (N.D.N.Y.
89.
1987) (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir. 1979)) (citing need to
effectuate court's inherent power to disqualify counsel when necessary "to preserve the
integrity of the adversary process"); Duca v. Raymark Indus., 663 F. Supp. 184, 188 (E.D.
Pa. 1986) (same); SMI Indus. Canada Ltd. v. Caelter Indus., Inc., 586 F. Supp. 808, 815
(N.D.N.Y. 1984) (citing "need to ensure both clients and the general public that lawyers will
act within the bounds of ethical conduct"); Black v. Missouri, 492 F. Supp. 848, 861 (W.D.
Mo. 1980) ("[W]here the interests of the public are so greatly implicated as they are in this
case, the Court believes that 'third parties' such as the district defendants should be entitled
to raise any apparent conflicts of interest which might undermine the validity of proceedings
in this case.").
See also Kaskie v. Celotex, Corp., 618 F. Supp. 696, 698 n.2 (N.D. I11.1985)
(applying "zone of interest" test with regard to Canon 4 of the Model Code to determine
whether party had Article III standing). In Kaskie, the third-party defendant moved to
disqualify defendant's attorney because he had represented third-party defendant's codefendant in a different but related litigation, and had thereby obtained confidential
information that could be used against third-party defendant. Id. at 698. The district court
conducted the standing inquiry as if Model Code Canon 4, which prohibits attorneys from
revealing client confidences, was a legislatively enacted statute. Id. The court asserted that
"the test for standing is whether [the] claim comes within the 'zone of interest to be
protected or regulated by the statute."' Id. (quoting Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs.,
Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970)). The court concluded that "[b]ecause [the
defendant] claims a breach of confidence within the zone of confidential relationships
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Association, in 1983, adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
which only require an attorney to "inform the appropriate professional
authority," courts had to find a new basis for standing. 90
2. The Model Rules and "PublicInterest" Standing
When federal courts began applying the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, or state rules that substantially incorporated the Model Rules,
courts turned to the language of the Model Rules. The Model Rules
provide that when a conflict clearly calls into question the "fair or efficient
administration of justice," opposing counsel may raise the question. 9' This
showing is easier to make in some courts than in others.92 In addition,
some courts appear to base standing on an even broader concept of public
interest. Earlier cases had suggested standing might be based on injury to
various public interests, 93 such as public confidence in the legal system, but

protected by Canon 4, [the defendant] has standing under this canon to bring [the motion]."
Kaskie, 618 F. Supp. at 698. This analysis is incomplete because the "zone of interest," as
articulated by the Supreme Court in Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150, 151-53 (1970), is a prudential standing requirement. If the constitutional
standing requirements are met, the test permits a plaintiff to sue if he can show that he is
within the group intended to benefit from the statute. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION § 2.3.6, at 98 (3d ed. 1999).
90.
But see Kevlik v. Goldstein, 724 F.2d 844, 847 n.4 (1st Cir. 1984) (asserting
that result would be the same whether resolved under the Model Rules or the Model Code).
91.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. (1983).
92.
See, e.g., Tizes v. Curcio, No. 94-C-7657, 1997 WL 116797, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 12, 1997) ("Except under special circumstances, a party may not seek disqualification
of opposing counsel."); Blanchard v. Edgemark Financial Corp., 175 F.R.D. 293, 306-08
(N.D. I1. 1997); USX Corp. v. Tieco, Inc., 929 F. Supp. 1455, 1459 (N.D. Ala. 1996)
("[S]ince the alleged conflict does not clearly call into question the fair or efficient
administration of justice, defendants may not properly raise the issue."); Dawson v. City of
Bartlesville, 901 F. Supp. 314, 315 (N.D. Okla. 1995) ("[Plaintiff s] allegations of potential
conflict do not trigger these high thresholds for standing"). For example, in determining
whether the alleged conflict threatened the fair or efficient administration of justice, the
court in Tizes noted that the conflict would have a negative effect on plaintiffs, not
defendants who had moved for disqualification. Tizes, 1997 WL 116797, at *2. In addition,
both Tizes and Blanchardwere decided after the Seventh Circuit decided In re Sandahl, 980
F.2d 1118, 1121 (7th Cir. 1992), in which the Court of Appeals denied standing based on
the lack of an attorney-client relationship, and without reference to the Model Rules "fair or
efficient administration of justice" standard.
93.
See supra note 89 (citing cases in which courts relied in part on public interest
bases for standing); see also Beck v. Bd. of Regents, 568 F. Supp. 1107, 1111 (D. Kan.
1983). In Beck, the court found that the defendants had standing to bring a conflict of
interest to its attention though the client whose interest was affected did not object. Id. at
1111. Although the court applied the Model Code to the plaintiffs' conduct, the court
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the adoption of the above language in the Model Rules appears to have
reinforced this basis for standing.
In Abbott v. Kidder Peabody & Co., for example, a Colorado district
court considered the issue of standing under the Colorado Rules of
Professional Conduct, which generally incorporate the provisions of the

Model Rules.94 Abbott was a securities lawsuit in which 200 individual

plaintiffs agreed to be represented by a single law firm. 95 Each of the
plaintiffs entered into a representation contract, which included certain

provisions intended to discourage plaintiffs from settling individually with

the defendants.9 6 The defendants moved to disqualify the firm from
representing the plaintiffs based upon ethical violations related to the terms
and conditions of the representation contract. 97 The plaintiffs' attorneys
argued that the defendants had no standing to move for disqualification.9 8
In concluding that the defendants had standing, the district court asserted
that an opposing party has standing to seek disqualification "where the
interests of the public are so greatly implicated that an apparent conflict of
interest may tend to undermine the validity of the proceedings." 99 The
court also cited a provision in the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct,
identical to the corresponding provision in the Model Rules, which states

"that opposing counsel may move for disqualification '[w]here the conflict

is such as clearly to call in question the fair or efficient administration of
appeared to base its finding of standing on a broader injury to public interests. The court
concluded that non-clients would have standing "where the interests of the public are so
greatly implicated that third parties, such as the defendants in this motion, are found to be
entitled to raise any apparent conflicts of interest which may tend to undermine the validity
of the proceedings." Id. at 1110 (emphasis added). The court further stated that:
[w]herever the actions of a member of the bar may in the eyes of the
public cast even the appearance of an impropriety upon the legal
profession, there exists an ethical duty upon each member of the bar and
upon the court itself to examine the conduct and determine if a breach of
professional ethic has occurred or is about to occur.
Id.

The court also based standing on finding that "the confidence in the integrity and
efficiency of the legal system and the legal profession [was] under scrutiny in this action,
and thus one which the court must examine." Id.at 1111.
94.
Abbott v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 42 F. Supp. 2d 1046 (D. Colo. 1999).
95.
Id.at 1048.
96.
Id. at 1048-49. For example, the contract included an escrow provision that
prevented any one plaintiff from receiving settlement proceeds until after every member of
the plaintiff group had settled their case. Id. at 1049.
97.
Id.at 1049-50.
Id.
98.
Id. at 1050 (citing Beck v. Bd. of Regents, 568 F. Supp. 1107, 1110 (D. Kan.
99.
1983)) (emphasis added).
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justice.""" 0 With regard to the facts of Abbott, the court concluded that
"there is a clear public policy issue regarding the ability of the Plaintiffs'
attorneys to provide individual counsel to individual plaintiffs under.., the
Colorado Rules of Professional Responsibility."'' 0 1 Thus, the court based
standing upon injury to the public interest as well as the provisions of the
Colorado Rules of Professional Responsibility.
In Chapman Engineers v. Natural Gas Sales Co., a Kansas district
court found standing based on the same reasoning. 10 2 The parties in
Chapman Engineers had negotiated for several years regarding several
contracts concerning the operation and sale of a gas plant.'0 The litigation
arose when one of the parties sued another for breach of contract, who in4
turn impleaded another of the parties for indemnity and contribution.'0
05
The third-party defendant settled the indemnity claim and left the scene.
The plaintiffs subsequently engaged the attorney who had represented the
06
third-party defendant in both the negotiations and the indemnity suit.
The defendants moved to disqualify the attorney, and the plaintiffs
challenged their standing to seek disqualification of the attorney. 0 7 The
court applied the same standard as the court in Abbott, asserting that when
the public interest is "so greatly implicated," non-clients have standing to
raise conflicts of interest that "may tend to undermine the validity of the
proceedings.'' 10 8 The court also relied upon the "fair or efficient
administration ofjustice" standard set forth in the Model Rules, which had
been adopted in Kansas.' 0 9 The court concluded that the plaintiff had
shown "a potential conflict of interest that greatly implicates public interest
and threatens the fairness of the trial."'" 10
B. THE RULE AGAINST NON-CLIENT STANDING

Numerous courts, including the Seventh, Eighth and Federal Circuits,
have held that non-clients do not have standing to move for disqualification

100.
1.7 cmt.).
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Abbott, 42 F. Supp. 2d at 1050 (quoting COLO. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
Id. (emphasis added).
Chapman Eng'rs v. Natural Gas Sales Co., 766 F. Supp. 949 (D. Kan. 1991).
Id.at 951-52.
Id. at 952.
Id.
Id. at 950-53.
Id. at 950, 954.
ChapmanEng'rs, 766 F. Supp. at 955.
Id.
Id.
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of an attorney. The Ninth, Second and D.C. Circuits also appear to have
denied standing to non-clients, although the standard they apply is unclear.
Some courts strictly adhere to the "general rule" that only clients may raise
a conflict of interest. They contend that non-client standing does not
further the purposes of the conflicts rules. Other courts, including possibly
the Fifth Circuit,1"' adhere to the general rule, but have identified narrow
exceptions that permit standing when the conflict is egregious. Finally, as
the Supreme Court has invigorated its standing jurisprudence, a few courts
have begun to determine whether non-clients have standing by applying the
constitutional and prudential standing doctrines developed by the Court.
1. The Strict Rule
Several circuits strictly adhere to the rule that non-clients do not have
standing to raise a motion for disqualification. The Eighth Circuit
announced its adherence to this rule in Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil, a civil
antitrust suit. 1 2 In Fred Weber, the defendants, Shell and Amoco, sought
to disqualify the plaintiffs attorney because he had been counsel for some3
of Shell and Amoco's co-defendants in a prior criminal antitrust suit."
During the criminal antitrust suit, the attorneys for the criminal defendants
agreed to work together on their defense, but the attorney in question had
not represented Shell or Amoco. 14 The Court of Appeals observed that
Canon 4, a provision of the Model Code prohibiting lawyers from
undertaking representations that give rise to a conflict, 1 5 "is limited by its
language to the duty of the lawyer to his client."'"l 6 Thus, the court
concluded, "one who seeks to employ Canon 4 to disqualify opposing
counsel must show that counsel to have, or to have had, an attorney-client
relationship with an adverse party in the present suit."1 17 Because neither
Shell nor Amoco was ever a client of the plaintiff's
attorney, they could not
18
move for disqualification under Canon 4.

111. See infra text accompanying notes 115-17.
112. Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602 (8th Cir. 1977).
113. Id. at 605.
114. Id.
115. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-5 (1980) ("Care should be
exercised by a lawyer to prevent the disclosure of the confidences and secrets of one client
to anolher, and no employment should be accepted that might require such disclosure.").
116. Fred Weber, Inc., 566 F.2d at 607-08.
117. Id. at 608.

118.

Id.
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In Telectronics Proprietary,Ltd. v. Medtronic, the Federal Circuit also
found that non-clients had no standing to raise a conflict of interest under
Canon 4. 9 The plaintiffs in Telectronics sought to have a patent declared
invalid. 20 The patent had been assigned to the defendant by another
company, which the plaintiffs attorneys had represented when the patent
was originally prosecuted.' 2 1 The defendant sought to have the attorneys
disqualified. 22 Although the defendant tried to claim "former client" status
as the assignee of the company that prosecuted the patent, the court
concluded that "the assignment of a patent does not transfer an attorneyclient relationship.' ' 23 Since no attorney client relationship existed, the
defendant could not seek disqualification.124 The plaintiff sought to get
around the limits of Canon 4 by seeking disqualification under the
"appearance of impropriety standard" of Canon 9.125 In rejecting that
argument, the court emphasized the requirement of an attorney-client
relationship, observing that "[t]he bottom line... is that attorneys represent
' 26
clients-not legal positions or patents."'
The Seventh Circuit has adopted perhaps the strictest rule that only
clients or former clients have standing to raise a conflict of interest. In In
re Sandahl, the plaintiff, which sought to disqualify the defendant's
attorney, was about to be bought by a third party. 127 The buyer had been a
client of the defendant's attorney up until the time of the suit.128 But the
party seeking disqualification, the plaintiff, was neither a client nor former
client of the attorney in question. Although the court would have applied
the Model Rules to the underlying ethical violation, 29 the court made no
reference to the "fair or efficient administration of justice standard" in
finding that the plaintiff lacked standing to move for disqualification. The
court began by noting that the former client had not objected.' 3" Then, the
court concluded that the plaintiff "has no standing" to assert the buyer's

119.
Cir. 1985).
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Telectronics Proprietary, Ltd. v. Medtronic, Inc., 836 F.2d 1332, 1336 (Fed.
Id. at 1333.
Id. at 1334.
Id.
Id. at 1336.
Id.
Telectronics, 836 F.2d at 1338.
Id.
In re Sandahl, 980F.2d 1118, 1121 (7thCir. 1992).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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rights to the attorney's "absolute loyalty."' 3 ' At least one district court in
the Seventh Circuit has declined to embellish the seemingly bright-line rule
adopted by the Court of Appeals. In Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit
Corp., the court asserted that "the proper party to raise the conflict of
interest issue, in a motion to disqualify counsel, is the party that this rule
' 32
was intended to protect-the client or former client."'
Several other federal circuits have decided cases in which they
indicated that non-clients did not have standing to raise a conflict of
interest, but did not expressly adopt such a rule. In UnitedStates v. Rogers,
before finding that an employee had been a "client" of the company's
counsel, the Second Circuit noted that "[n]o case has been called to our
attention, and we are aware of none, in which an attorney has been
disqualified on grounds of conflicting prior representation solely at the
behest of a person other than the former client or its privy."' 133 In In re
Corn Derivatives Antitrust Litigation,the Third Circuit "assum[ed] without
' 34
deciding that a motion to disqualify must be brought by a former client."'
In Kasza v. Browner, the Ninth Circuit observed that "[w]e have difficulty
seeing how [the plaintiff] has standing to complain about a possible conflict
of interest arising out of common representation of defendants in different
civil actions, having nothing to do with her own representation."' 135 The
government defendants in the case did not press the issue, so the court
declined to rule on it. Finally, the D.C. District Court decided what is
certainly the most prominent of these cases, Alexander v. FBI, the
underlying facts of which were known as "Filegate."'' 36 In that case, the
President sought to intervene, and to be represented by two large D.C. law
137
firms which had advised some the defendants-all aides of the President.
The plaintiffs moved to disqualify the firms because if one of the aides
were to reveal that he engaged in improper conduct on the advice of the
firms, it could exculpate the President, but would not be in the best interest
of the firms. 38 Thus, the alleged conflict would have been between the
interests of the President and those of the firms. The court suggested that
the plaintiff had no standing, noting that "even if the plaintiffs had standing

131. Id.
132. No. 93-C-4017, 1995 WL 319635, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 25, 1995).
133. United States v. Rogers, 9 F.3d 1025, 1031 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing In re Yarn
Processing Patent Validity Litigation, 530 F.2d 83, 91 (5th Cir. 1976)).
134. In re Corn Derivatives Antitrust Litigation, 748 F.2d 157, 161 (3d Cir. 1984).
135. Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1171 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing United States v.
Rogers, 9 F.3d 1025, 1031 (2d Cir. 1993)).
136. Alexander v. FBI, 186 F.R.D. 21, 31-33 (D.D.C. 1997).
137. Id.
138. Id.
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[they] provided absolutely no evidence that such
to make this assertion...
' 39
exists."'
a conflict
2. The "NarrowExceptions" of Yarn Processing
In an odd twist of fate, the Fifth Circuit also issued one of the seminal
opinions denying standing to non-clients seeking disqualification of an
attorney in In re Yarn Processing.'40 Moreover, the same district court
judge, C. Clyde Atkins, decided the initial motions in both Gopman and
Yarn Processing.'41 The Fifth Circuit affirmed both decisions without
distinguishing them.1 42 In Gopman, the Court of Appeals observed that an
attorney is "not only authorized but is in fact obligated," to bring a conflict
to the court's attention. 143 In Yarn Processing,decided only weeks earlier,
the Fifth Circuit asserted that there existed only narrow exceptions to the
general rule that courts do not disqualify an attorney unless the former
client seeks disqualification. 144 Although the Yarn Processing court
apparently intended to establish a broad rule denying standing to nonclients, other courts have relied upon the case for the flexibility that45the
"narrow exceptions" and the policy considerations inject into the rule.
In Yarn Processing, yam manufacturers sued the holder of several
yarn processing patents alleging antitrust violations and the invalidity of
the patents.' 46 The attorney for one manufacturer had for a number of years
represented a licensee and co-venturer of the patent holder. 47 At one point
in the litigation, the licensee was named as a defendant and sought to
disqualify the attorney. 48 The manufacturer decided instead to dismiss the
complaint against the licensee. 149 Although the attorney's former client
was no longer a party to the litigation, the patent holder persisted with the

139. Id. at 32.
140. 530 F.2d 83, 88-89 (5th Cir. 1976).
CompareIn re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litig., 530 F.2d 83, 91 (5th Cir.
141.
1976), with In re Gopman, 531 F.2d 262, 262 (5th Cir. 1976).
142. Of the two cases, Yarn Processing appears to be the binding precedent in the
Eleventh Circuit--then the Fifth Circuit. See Davis v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 149 F.R.D.
666, 672 n.2 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
143. In re Gopman, 531 F.2d 262, 265 (5th Cir. 1976).
144. In re Yam Processing Patent Validity Litig., 530 F.2d 83, 88-89 (5th Cir. 1976).
145. See, e.g., Davis v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 149 F.R.D. 666, 673 (S.D. Fla.
1993).
146. In re Yarn Processing,530 F.2d at 87.
147. Id. at 86-87.
148. Id. at 86.
149. Id.
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motion to disqualify. 5 ° The patent holder argued that it "had a right to
expect that the validity and enforceability of [the] patent would not be
subject to attack by counsel who had represented [its licensee] on [a]
15
substantially related matter."' 1
The court began by applying the general rule that only clients and
former clients can raise a conflict of interest. The court noted that the
conflicts rules rest on the duties of an attorney that arise from the attorneyclient relationship. 5 2 "In the absence of [the] relationship, the duties of
loyalty and confidentiality do not arise.' 53 Had the licensee believed its
interests were threatened by the attorney's continued representation of the
manufacturer, the licensee could have intervened and pressed for the
attorney's disqualification. 54 Because the patent holder was never a client
of the attorney, the court concluded that it had no standing to seek
disqualification. 15
Then, the court observed that permitting the patent holder to move for
disqualification would not further the policies behind the conflicts rules.
The court explained that the rule permitting former clients to seek
disqualification is intended to preserve confidences of the former client that
may have been disclosed to the attorney156 The court indicated that the
rule also aimed at preserving "public confidence in the legal profession and
157
the judicial process even if the former client is not in fact damaged."'
Such considerations do not apply when the former client does not object to
the representation. 8 Furthermore, the court observed, "[t]o allow an
unauthorized surrogate to champion the rights of... former client[s] would
allow the surrogate to use the conflicts rules for his own purposes where a
genuine conflict might not really exist."'' 59 Thus, the court refused to
extend standing to a party that "has no right of his own which is
160
invaded."
The Fifth Circuit did not, however, adopt a strict rule that non-clients
could never have standing to raise a conflict of interest. The court
suggested that non-clients would have standing "where the unethical nature

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id.
Id. at 90.
In re Yarn Processing,530 F.2d at 90.
Id.
Id. at 88.
Id. at 90.
Id. at 89.
Id.
In re Yarn Processing,530 F.2d at 89.
Id. at 90.
Id.
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is
of the attorney's change of sides" is "manifest and glaring" or where it 161
"open and obvious and confront[s] the court with a plain duty to act."
Other courts have found that these "narrow exceptions" inject flexibility
rule that non-clients do not have standing to raise a conflict
into the general
62
of interest. 1
C. CONSTITUTIONAL STANDING

As the Supreme Court has elucidated the constitutional nature of
standing analysis in recent years, 163 a few courts have begun to apply this
analysis to determine whether non-clients have standing to move for
disqualification. In particular, a district court in the Central District of
California recently decided a case in which it conducted a vigorous analysis
of constitutional standing as it applies to non-clients. In Colyer v. Smith,
the plaintiff filed suit against the now-infamous Riverside County Sheriffs
Department alleging that he had been wrongfully transferred from his
duties as a trainer and expert witness for the Department. 64 The transfer
was allegedly in retaliation for testimony that the plaintiff had given in a
termination hearing for a deputy sheriff.165 The plaintiff had opined that
the deputy sheriffs use of force during a forcible arrest had been
reasonable and within the policies of the Department. 166 The plaintiff
moved to disqualify the Department's attorneys because they had
represented the deputy in a civil suit against him by the individuals who
were forcibly arrested, and were currently representing him in an unrelated
use-of-force case. 167 The plaintiff contended that the attorneys should be
them in
disqualified because representation of the Department placed
168
conflict with the interests of their current and former client.

161. Id. at 89-90.
162. See, e.g. Decaview Distribution Co. v. Decaview Asia Corp., No. C-99-02555,
2000 WL 1175583, at *9 (N.D. Cal. 2000) ("This is undoubtedly what the Yarn Processing
court had in mind when it indicated that a 'manifest and glaring' ethical breach which
'confronted the court with a plain duty to act' could be addressed on the motion of a nonclient litigant.").
163.

See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-14, at 107 (2d

ed. 1988) (noting that "the Supreme Court's view of standing has evolved considerably in
recent years.").
164. Colyer v. Smith, 50 F. Supp. 2d 966, 966 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
165. Id. at 967.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 968.
168. Id.
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After setting out the requirements for constitutional standing, 69 the
court in Colyer announced that "a nonclient litigant must establish a
personal stake in the motion to disqualify sufficient to satisfy the
'irreducible constitutional minimum' of Article IlI."' 7 The court further
explained that only a former or current client "will have such a stake in a
conflict of interest dispute."' 71 However, a non-client might have standing
"ina case where the ethical breach so infects the litigation in which
disqualification is sought that it impacts the moving party's interest in a
just and lawful determination of her claims.' 72
Based on this analysis, the court found that the plaintiff lacked
standing to bring the motion for disqualification. 73 The plaintiff argued
that the attorneys' representation of the Department would violate their
duty of loyalty to the deputy because the representation would require them
to discredit the plaintiff's testimony, which the deputy might need if the
State granted an appeal of his termination. 74 Moreover, the representation
would present a risk that confidential information shared by the deputy
with the attorneys during their representation of him would be disclosed." 5
The court nonetheless concluded that the plaintiff had no personal stake in
the attorneys' breach of their duties to the deputy. 176 He had no personal
right that was burdened by the alleged conflict of interest. 17 7 Only the
deputy had a personal right to have his attorneys remain loyal and keep
confidences, and only he would suffer "injury in fact" from the attorneys'
breach of duty.
V. APPLICATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL STANDING ANALYSIS
The rule-based standing relied upon in many of the precedents
discussed in this paper clearly do not meet the "personal stake" requirement
for constitutional standing. As the Colyer court acknowledged "regardless
of the ...applicable rules ...an attorney can have no sufficiently personal
'injury in fact' based on the conflict status of her opposing counsel" to

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

See supra text accompanying notes 34-35.
Colyer v. Smith, 50 F. Supp. 2d 966, 971 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 973.
Id. at 969.
Id.
Colyer, 50 F. Supp. 2d at 973.
Id.
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move for disqualification of such counsel. 17 8 The cases based on rulebased standing allege only a generalized interest in the integrity of the
judicial system. 179 The Supreme Court has rejected such generalized
interests as a basis for standing.18 ° The Court has required that a party
' 81
show invasion of an interest that is "concrete" and "particularized."'
Although this requirement is somewhat ambiguous, a movant's interest in
the administration of justice clearly is not sufficiently concrete and
particularized to support a finding of standing.
Despite the more stringent requirements for constitutional standing,
their application does not mean that non-clients will never have standing to
raise a conflict. A year after Colyer, a district court in the Northern District
of California found that a non-client had standing based on the
constitutional analysis set forth in Colyer. In Decaview DistributionCo. v.
Decaview Asia Corp., the plaintiff, a Taiwanese corporation, had set up a
U.S. subsidiary and hired the defendant to serve as Chief Executive
Officer.182 After the U.S. subsidiary racked up $3.5 million in outstanding
accounts receivable, the plaintiff became suspicious of the defendant's
business dealings. 183 After some investigation, the plaintiff filed suit to
obtain a receiver to take possession of the premises of the U.S. subsidiary,
and subsequently to bring the U.S. subsidiary into involuntary
bankruptcy.184 When the plaintiff later brought a suit for damages against
the defendant, he was represented by the same attorneys who represented
both the U.S. subsidiary and the defendant in the receivership and
bankruptcy actions. 85 The plaintiff moved to disqualify the attorneys on
obtained
grounds that, in representing the U.S. subsidiary, they had
186
plaintiff.
the
to
belonged
that
information
financial
confidential
The court concluded that the plaintiff had constitutional standing to
bring the motion to disqualify. The court found that the attorneys'
possession of confidential financial information jointly owned by the U.S.
subsidiary and the plaintiff would put the defendant at a significant

178. Id. at 972.
179. Id.
180. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.3.5, at 94-96 (3d ed.
1999).
181. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
182. Decaview Distribution Co. v. Decaview Asia Corp., No. C-99-02555, 2000 WL
1175583, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2000).

183.

184.
185.
186.

Id.

Id. at *2.
Id.
Id. at'*10-12.
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disadvantage in the litigation.187 The attorneys could use the plaintiffs
confidential information against the plaintiff. That they could do so was
demonstrated by the fact that the attorneys had previously offered to return
the confidential information in return for dismissing the bankruptcy
proceeding against the U.S. subsidiary. 88 Thus, because the ethical breach
would significantly impact the plaintiffs interest in a just and lawful
determination of its claims, the court concluded that the plaintiff had
established a personal stake in the motion to disqualify sufficient to satisfy
89
the requirements of constitutional standing. 1
In addition, a number of the cases discussed in this paper, in which
courts found that the movant had rule-based standing, would satisfy the
requirements for constitutional standing. For example, recall United States
v. Clarkson, in which the defendant, an attorney, was being prosecuted for
fraud in the preparation of tax refunds for various taxpayers. 190 During the
government's investigation, the attorney asserted that he was representing
the very taxpayers whose claims for refunds were under investigation.' 9'
Citing Gopman and Estates Theatres, cases in which the courts found rulebased standing, the Fourth Circuit concluded that "[t]he propriety of the
Government's action in filing the motion to disqualify cannot be
questioned."'' 92 It is clear, however, that the moving party in Clarkson, the
government, also would meet the requirements for constitutional standing.
The attorney's representation of the taxpayers threatened the government
with injury in fact. The attorney had asserted the right to represent the
taxpayers and to advise them in connection with their interviews with the
government. 193 He also wrote letters to the government alleging that the
witnesses were repudiating the statements they had previously given the
government's agents. '94 Finally, the atforney asserted that the government
could only communicate with the taxpayers, who were potential witnesses
in the government's case against the attorney, through the attorney.195
Reviewing these facts, the court indicated that the attorney's actions were
interfering with the government's ability to deal with the taxpayers. 96
Thus, Clarkson appears to be a case in which the ethical breach so infects
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the litigation that it impacts the moving party's interests in a just and lawful
determination of its claims. Thus, the government, a non-client, would
have constitutional standing to move for the disqualification of the attorney
from representing the taxpayers.
Kevlik v. Goldstein, in which the First Circuit found rule-based
standing, 197 probably would be another case in which the moving party
would have constitutional standing. Recall that in Kevlik, three plaintiffs
false arrest.1 98
brought a civil rights action against a town for an allegedly
One of the plaintiffs initially engaged the attorney that ultimately
represented the town. 99 After retaining another attorney, the plaintiff
settled with the town. 200 The remaining plaintiffs later moved to disqualify
the attorney because the plaintiff who had settled was to be called as a
witness, and the attorney possessed privileged information that could be
used during the witness's testimony. 20 An attorney generally may not
oppose his former client if, during the representation, he obtained
information "relevant to the controversy at hand," because of the danger
that he may misuse the confidential information.20 2 In this case, the
confidential information necessarily involved information regarding the
remaining plaintiffs. The danger for them was the same as if they were
former clients. The attorney might use the information against them in his
defense of the town. This threatened injury probably would be sufficient to
give them a "personal stake" in the motion to disqualify. The attorney's
ethical breach would be such that it would impact the remaining plaintiffs'
interests in a just and lawful determination of their claims.
Thus, although constitutional standing is more difficult to establish
than rule-based standing, application of the constitutional standing
requirements to non-clients would not contravene the purposes of the
conflicts rules. Indeed, the requirements for constitutional standing are
much like the standard set out in Yarn Processing and subsequently
followed by many courts. As noted previously, Yarn Processing was
intended to establish a broad rule denying standing to non-clients, but
subsequent courts have further developed the "narrow exceptions"
identified by the Fifth Circuit. For example, in Davis v. Southern Bell
Telephone & Telegraph Co., the state had intervened as a plaintiff in an
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antitrust class action against the telephone company.2 °3 The telephone
company sought to disqualify class counsel from representing both the
class and the state. 204 The telephone company contended that the dual
representation gave the attorneys access to information obtained under
government authority not available to private litigants, and that the Model
Rules prohibited the release of such information.2 °5 The telephone
company argued that use of this information by the attorneys would
adversely affect its ability to make its case.20 6
The district court countered plaintiffs' argument that Yarn Processing
had established a broad rule that, with only narrow exceptions, denied nonclients standing. "In Yarn Processing,the court explained that: 'To allow
an unauthorized surrogate to champion the rights of the former client would
allow that surrogate to use the conflicts rules for his own purposes where a
genuine conflict might not really exist.' 20 7 The district court further noted
the statement by the Yarn Processingcourt that it was reluctant to extend
standing to raise a conflict of interest "where the party ...has no right of
his own which is invaded., 20 8 The district court observed that this
statement:
makes clear that, where the rights of a particular party may
be compromised by representation in which opposing
counsel is engaged, then that party has standing to bring a
motion to disqualify, regardless of whether the party is a
client or former client of the attorney
or firm whose
20 9
challenges.
party
the
representation
The district court concluded that there was considerable risk that
decisions concerning the use of government information would be made
"in favor of private interests at the expense of the public interest. 2 10 The
court observed that when government information is used in this manner,
"a private litigant opposing a party with access to governmental authority
suffers an unfair disadvantage.,' 2 1 The court concluded that the risk that
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the telephone company would suffer such a disadvantage was sufficient to,
confer standing.212
Thus, the analysis undertaken by the Davis court was quite similar to
the injury-in-fact inquiry mandated by the Constitution. The threatened
ethical breach was such that it would impact the telephone company's
interests in a just and lawful determination of its claims. The similarity
between the Yarn Processing standard and the requirements for
constitutional standing suggests that, in a substantial number of cases, the
standing analysis will not change significantly. Moreover, it demonstrates
that application of the constitutional standing requirements will not
undermine the purposes of the conflicts rules. As the Yarn Processing
court explained:
The underlying rules relating to attorney conflicts of
interest are designed to allay any apprehension a client
may have in frank discussion of confidential information
with his attorney. Public confidence in the privacy of this
discussion should not be impaired where the former client
having every opportunity to do so, fails to object to a new
relationship involving his former attorney ...213
Moreover, application of the constitutional standing rules will prevent
non-clients from using the conflicts rules for their own strategic purposes,
one of the main concerns of the Yarn Processing court. As one court
recently observed after much time and energy had been expended by a nonclient seeking to disqualify opposing counsel, "it would appear that
Defendants are genuinely concerned that their opponents will be at a
disadvantage in the event that present counsel are allowed to continue to
represent them., 214 For example, the moving party in Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp. v. DanielInternationalCorp., which the Fifth Circuit found
to have rule-based standing, probably would not satisfy the constitutional
standing requirements. Recall that in that case, a complex breach of
contract dispute, a fourth-party defendant moved to disqualify an attorney
who represented both the fourth-party plaintiff and another fourth-party
defendant, which were affiliated corporations. 21 5 Technically, the attorney
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was representing opposing litigants, which both the Model Code and Model
Rules prohibit. It was clear, however, that the affiliated corporations had
substantial identity of interests. The capital stock of each was owned by
the same family. 216 The only reason the one impleaded the other was to
make possible the impleader of the moving party as a fifth-party
defendant.21 7 In other words, the moving party's presence in the case
depended on the affiliated corporations' willingness to litigate. Thus, the
moving party had a strategic interest in increasing the expense of litigation
for the affiliated corporations, and thereby discouraging them from
litigating. The moving party had no personal stake in the litigation other
than its strategic interest. Thus, the alleged ethical breach was not such that
it would impact in any way the moving party's interests in a just and lawful
determination of its claims.
VI. CONCLUSION

For many years, courts found that the Model Code and the Model
Rules conferred standing on non-clients moving to disqualify an attorney.
In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has increased the vigor with
which it applies the requirements of constitutional standing. Its precedents
in this area would appear to require courts to apply the constitutional
standing requirements in cases in which a non-client moves for
disqualification. Some observers may be concerned that requiring nonclients to satisfy these requirements will impede enforcement of the
conflicts rules.
However, as this paper has demonstrated, these
requirements will further the purposes of the conflicts rules, not impede
them. In some courts these requirements will provide constitutional
underpinnings to non-client standing rules that have been in place for years.
Moreover, these requirements will prevent parties who are unaffected by an
alleged conflict of interest from abusing the conflicts rules for their own
strategic purposes.
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